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PURITY VERSUS PLUGOLA: A STUDY OF THE
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION'S
SPONSORSHIP IDENTIFICATION RULES
David W. Maher*
INTRODUCTION
The broadcast commercial, deeply imbedded in the communications in-
dustry's programming, has been subjected to numerous statutory and ad-
ministrative rules. The author undertakes a study of the successes and
failures of the Federal Communications Commission's administrative
scheme with respect to identification of commercial material. Viewing the
Commission's repeated pronouncements with bemusement, the author crit-
icizes present and proposed regulations in terms of their practicality for
the broadcast industry. In conclusion, Mr. Maher asks for the production
of practical, consistent and unambiguous regulations which will aid broad-
cast development while maintaining the content deserved by the public.
Aio and television commercials are the price that we pay
for "free" radio and television, and they seem to be a price -that
most Americans are willing to pay. Many have become as
much a part of American life and language as any dramatic or literary
works. In fact, a number of them show as much quality, by any
standard, as many modern dramatic and literary productions. One
reason for this is, of course, their cost; a normal television commer-
cial can easily cost as much as $30,000 to produce, which does not
include residual payments to actors or the cost of broadcast station
time for airing the commercial.'
Many people like commercials. A study commissioned by the
Columbia Broadcasting System in 1970 showed that 70 percent of
those interviewed considered commercials to be a fair price to pay
for the entertainment broadcast and 54 percent considered commer-
cials so good that they are more entertaining than the program.
* Partner, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Illinois. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the research assistance of Samuel Fifer, a member of the DePaul Law Re-
view.
1. See M. MAYER, ABouT TELEVISION (1972).
903
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
However, 43 percent found commercials generally in poor taste and
very annoying, although only 30 percent said they would rather pay
a small amount yearly to have television without commercials.2
Given the importance of radio and television commercials in the
broadcast industry and the American economy, it is not surprising
that the federal government has undertaken to regulate them. This
article is a study of the successes and failures of the Federal Com-
munications Commission in one aspect of the administrative law
processes that concern broadcast commercials. This is not a treat-
ment of deceptive or unfair advertising or any of the issues that in-
volve the Federal Trade Commission. Rather, the article will con-
cern itself with the Communications Act of 1934 and the regulations,
existing and proposed, issued pursuant to the Act relating to the
question of sponsorship identification.
From a government regulatory standpoint, commercials in broad-
casting had a bad start. In 1925, at the Fourth National Radio Con-
ference, the Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover said that
[We can surely agree that no one can raise a cry of deprivation of free
speech if he is compelled to prove that there is something more than naked
commercial selfishness in his purpose.3
There was and is a substantial body of opinion that agrees with
this view, and it has colored all congressional efforts to deal with
the problem of regulating the electromagnetic spectrum.
The early history of broadcasting made it clear that some form
of governmentally enforced traffic control was needed to prevent
electronic chaos. The result might have been legislation that was
strictly limited to technical aspects of spectrum allocation. Instead,
the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934 delve
deeply into all aspects of programming, directly through provisions
such as the equal-time requirements for political candidates, and
indirectly through the licensing process and the requirement of ser-
vice in the "public interest, convenience, and necessity. . . .
The Radio Act and the Communications Act do not, of course,
exist in a constitutional vacuum. Both have condemned censorship,
and section 326 of the Communications Act is explicit:
2. See R.T. BOWEN, TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC (1973).
3. PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH NATIONAL RADIO CONFERENCE 7 (1926).
4. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1970).
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Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or
signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition
shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio communication. 5
Censorship of commercial speech as used in the Act, however, is
not necessarily censorship, according to the Supreme Court. The
recent decision in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission
on Human Relations6 emphasizes the continuing vitality of Justice
Roberts' view that "the Constitution imposes no such restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising."'  On the
other hand, Justice Douglas believes "that commercial materials also
have First Amendment protection."'8
In any event, first amendment considerations have not deterred
the Federal Communications Commission from making value judg-
ments about the content of commercial material, about permissible
amounts of commercial material, and about the substantive topic of
this article: identification of commercial material.
A recent expression of the Commission's views can be found in
the Tentative Report and Order adopted on May 13, 1970 in Docket
Number 14119, "In the Matter of Broadcast Announcement of Fi-
nancial Interests of Broadcast Stations and Networks and Their Prin-
cipals and Employees in Service and Commodities Receiving Broad-
cast Promotions." In that Tentative Report and Order, the Com-
mission said:
(a) The public interest requires that, insofar as possible, broadcast ma-
terial be presented on the basis of its own merit, appeal, popularity, or
significance, and not because of outside financial interests in that which
is presented.
(b) Both the public interest and the provisions and purposes of Section
317 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, require that, to the
extent such outside financial interests are or may be a factor influencing
the selection and presentation of broadcast material, the existence of such
interests must be disclosed to the audience, so that it may evaluate the
material with this knowledge. 9
5. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970).
6. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
7. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). See also, Note, Com-
mercial Speech-An End in Sight to Chrestensen?, 23 DEPAUL L. REv. 1258
(1974).
8. 413 U.S. at 398 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
9. Tentative Report and Order, F.C.C. Doc. No. 14119, at 31, in Notice of Ten-
tative Report and Order in Docket No. 14119, May 19, 1970 [hereinafter cited as
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This article will examine the extent to which the public interest
requirements established by the Commission have been or are cap-
able of being met. The article will deal first with the constitutional
and legislative framework applicable, and then with the current and
proposed regulations of the Commission.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE ASPECTS
The first amendment states clearly and simply that "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech
.... lO Despite the clarity, the debate over whether the amend-
ment means exactly what it says, "no law," or something less de-
manding has been resolved, at least for the present, in favor of the
latter interpretation. This is especially true with respect to speech
activities that take place in a commercial context.
The regulation of the content of commercial advertising is an ac-
tivity that tests the limits of first amendment protections. To say
that an advertiser may not advertise his product, or solicit for sales
in a particular manner, is to deny his "freedom of speech," as that
phrase is commonly understood, unless there exists some particu-
larly compelling reason to limit his activity. The reasons that have
been used as a basis for such denial include, for example, promul-
gation of false and misleading advertising,'1 the issuance of mis-
leading proxy solicitations,' 2 and the advertising of such products
as contraceptives,' 3 cigarettes, 4 liquor,' 5 as well as the services of
an optician. 16  In all of these examples, some apparently legitimate
Tentative Report and Order]. P & F RADIO REG. CURRENT SERVICE 53:295
(1970).
10. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). See also Legislation and Administration, A New
Antitoxin to Advertising Artifice-Television Advertising and the Federal Trade
Commission, 37 NOTRE DAME LAw. 524 (1962); Developments in the Law-Decep-
tive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1005 (1967).
12. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971), rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972); SEC v. May, 229 F.2d
123 (2d Cir. 1956).
13. Planned Parenthood Comm. v. Maricopa County, 92 Ariz. 231, 375 P.2d
719 (1962).
14. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932); Capital Broadcasting Co. v.
Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), afI'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
15. Portwood v. Falls City Brewing Co., 318 S.W.2d 535 (Ky. Ct. App. 1958).
16. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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legislative purpose was being served. The protection of the public
health and welfare was involved either by preventing the dissemina-
tion of false or misleading information, a concept related to tradi-
tional theories of fraud, or by preventing the dissemination of infor-
mation that was thought to have some potentially harmful impact
upon the public, notwithstanding its factual truth. The former of
these motives would seem to be more consistent with the first
amendment, which was certainly never intended to condone fraud.
The latter motive, however, would not seem to pass constitutional
muster in those instances where it subsumes a kind of paternalism
that is inconsistent with the style of cognitive free choice that the
first amendment seeks to promote.
Much of the legal analysis of advertising regulation has ignored
distinctions between proper and improper motives for the limitation
of first amendment protections and has been devoted instead to at-
tempts to find distinctions between commercial speech and other
"purer" forms of speech:
Commercial advertising might be distinguished from political and social
advocacy because the advertiser's motive or purpose appears to be eco-
nomic gain, or because the advertisement seeks to influence private deci-
sions among economic alternatives. A distinction based on the advertiser's
self-serving motive is inadequate, however, for much political and other
traditionally protected expression is motivated by self-interest. The dis-
tinction between speech influencing private economic decisions and other
speech seems more significant.' 7
However, the mere introduction of an element of economic self-
interest into a communication message would hardly justify a higher
degree of regulation than is consistent with the first amendment.
For example, books published for profit are not thereby removed
from the cloak of first amendment protection,' 8 and no one would
seriously question that "[t]he value of a free interchange of ideas
justifies extending first amendment protection to all political, social,
and literary expression, even that disseminated by economic associa-
tions or motivated by economic self-interest."' 9
Some commentators avoid the conceptual difficulties, created by
17. Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HAv. L. REv.
1191, 1192 (1965).
18. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
19. Supra note 17, at 1194.
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their recognition that economics is all-pervasive, by begging the
question:
The possibly desirable objectives furthered by advertising would not seem
to require its protection by the first amendment, particularly since the pri-
mary purpose of commercial advertising is to advance the economic wel-
fare of business enterprises, over which state and federal government enjoy
wide powers of regulation.20
Accepting this observation, there still remains the question whether
regulation over broadcast licensees by the federal government, regu-
lation that is clearly necessary to prevent chaos in the electro-
magnetic spectrum, justifies regulation of advertising practices. For
example, state regulation over corporations that own newspapers has
never justified regulation of their advertising policies.
Although the excerpt quoted above does not answer any ques-
tions, it does raise yet another basis for distinction between constitu-
tionally permissible and impermissible limitations on speech in ad-
vertising. Reference is made to the primary purpose of commercial
advertising: the advancement of the economic welfare of business
enterprises. This suggests that limitations may more appropriately
be placed upon the advertiser than upon the medium through which
he expresses himself. The position may be taken that when adver-
tising is a direct part of commercial activity, its speech component
is swept aside by the decision to view advertising as simply commer-
cial conduct-which is clearly reachable by the law consistent with
the first amendment-except to the degree that speech and com-
mercial activity become so intertwined that the speech component
cannot be separated without doing great damage to a commercial
operator's right to engage in an activity that is protected constitution-
ally, such as political activity. 1
The courts have not pursued these subtleties in their treatment
of the first amendment advertising cases. The line of cases reach-
ing from Valentine v. Chrestensen22 to Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Commission on Human Relations28 simply stands for the
20. Id. at 1195.
21. This right must be exercised in good faith, and the protections of the first
amendment must not be claimed in order to clothe objectionable commercial activity
with the privilege. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961) (dictum); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942).
22. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
23. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
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proposition that commercial speech is not worthy of the protection
accorded other forms of speech by the first amendment. Both the
Congress, in its deliberations on legislation, and the Federal Com-
munications Commission, in its interpretation of sections 317 and 326
of the Communications Act, have accepted this proposition whole-
heartedly and have framed their respective legislative and regulatory
proposals accordingly.
The concept of requiring identification of commercial matter in
broadcast programs dates back nearly to the beginning of broadcast
regulation. The genesis of section 317 was the congressional hear-
ings leading to the passage of the Radio Act of 1927.24 Section
317, in its original form, was substantially the same as section 19
of the Radio Act.25 Section 19, in turn, was derived from a law
passed in 1912 concerning newspaper advertising, a version of
which is still in force, providing:
[All editorial or other reading matter published in any such newspaper,
magazine, or periodical for the publication of which money or other val-
uable consideration is paid, accepted, or promised shall be plainly marked
'Advertisement.' Any editor or publisher printing editorial or other read-
ing matter for which compensation is paid, shall upon conviction in any
court having jurisdiction, be fined not less than fifty dollars ($50) nor
more than five hundred dollars ($500).26
There is no report of any fine ever being levied pursuant to this
statute.27
24. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, §1 1 et seq., 44 Stat. 1162.
25. The predecessor form read as follows:
All matter broadcast by any radio station for which service, money, or
any other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or prom-
ised to or charged or accepted by, the station so broadcasting, from any
person shall, at the time the same is so broadcast, be announced as paid
for or furnished, as the case may be, by such person.
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 317, 48 Stat. 1089.
26. 37 Stat. 554 (1912). See 39 C.F.R. § 123.7. Cf., 18 U.S.C. §§ 612, 1734
(1970). Section 612 requires identification of the source of writings concerning
candidates in federal political campaigns and section 1734 requires publications en-
tered in second class mail to be identified as advertisements if the publisher has
received or been promised a valuable consideration.
27. Prior to 1960, there were limited judicial and administrative decisions involv-
ing section 317. In 1939, the power of the Commission to adopt regulations imple-
menting section 317 was upheld in Yankee Network v. FCC, 107 F.2d 212 (D.C.
Cir. 1939). See also Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 223 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 115
(1956); Noerr Motor Freight v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp.
768 (E.D. Pa. 1957). The Commission, prior to 1960, took the position that the
furnishing of program materials such as records and scripts to a broadcaster did
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:903
The Communications Act Amendments of 196028 made many
changes in the existing law, most of which were directed at provid-
ing for procedures to govern the behavior of license applicants in
the period of time preceding a grant.2" The then-current "payola"
and quiz program scandals prompted other changes, including the
passage of an amended section 317 and a new section 508.0 The
not constitute valuable consideration unless those materials involved controversial
issues or political matters. Docket No. 6672, September 29, 1944. In 1958, the
Commission warned broadcasters that the supplying of films by the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers concerning congressional hearings required an announce-
ment of the sources of the films. Kohler Kinescope Cases, 17 R.R. 553 (1958),
17 R.R. 556a (1958), 17 R.R. 556d (1958).
28. Pub. L. No. 86-752, 74 Stat. 889.
29. The sections of title 47 affected were §§ 154(b), 307(d), 309, 311, 312(a)
and (b), 317, 504(a) and (b), 508, and 509.
30. The sections provide as follows:
ANNOUNCEMENT WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN
MATTER BROADCAST
SEc. 317. (a) (1) All matter broadcast by any radio station for which any
money, service or other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or
promised to or charged or accepted by, the station so broadcasting, from any
person, shall, at the time the same is so broadcast, be announced as paid for
or furnished, as the case may be, by such person: Provided, That "service or
other valuable consideration" shall not include any service or property furnished
without charge or at a nominal charge for use on, or in connection with, a
broadcast unless it is so furnished in consideration for an identification in a
broadcast of any person, product, service, trademark, or brand name beyond
an identification which is reasonably related to the use of such service or prop-
erty on the broadcast.
(2) Nothing in this section shall preclude the Commission from requiring
that an appropriate announcement shall be made at the time of the broadcast
in the case of any political program or any program involving the discussion
of any controversial issue for which any films, records, transcriptions, talent,
scripts, or other material or service of any kind have been furnished, without
charge or at a nominal charge, directly or indirectly, as an inducement to the
broadcast of such program.
(b) In any case where a report has been made to a radio station, as
required by section 508 of this Act, of circumstances which would have
required an announcement under this section had the consideration been
received by such radio station, an appropriate announcement shall be
made by such radio station.
(c) The licensee of each radio station shall exercise reasonable dili-
gence to obtain from its employees, and from other persons with whom
it deals directly in connection with any program or program matter for
broadcast, information to enable such licensee to make the announcement
required by this section.
(d) The Commission may waive the requirement of an announcement
as provided in this section in any case or class of cases with respect to
which it determines that the public interest, convenience, or necessity does
not require the broadcasting of such announcement.
(e) The Commission shall prescribe appropriate rules and regulations
910
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goal of the amendments, insofar as sections 317 and 508 were con-
cerned, was securing expanded identification of sponsored material
in broadcasts. Specifically, the Special Subcommittee on Legislative
Oversight recommended the following:
Section 317 should be amended to require announcement of payments
made not only to licensees but also to any other individuals or companies
for advertising "plugs" on behalf of third parties on sponsored programs.
Provision should be made to prohibit payment to any person or company
or the receipt by any person or company for the purpose of having in-
to carry out the provisions of this section.
DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN PAYMENTS
Sac. 508. (a) Subject to subsection (d), any employee of a radio sta-
tion who accepts or agrees to accept from any person (other than such
station), or any person (other than such station) who pays or agrees to
pay such employee, any money, service or other valuable consideration for
the broadcast of any matter over such station shall, in advance of such
broadcast, disclose the fact of such acceptance or agreement to such sta-
tion.
(b) Subject to subsection (d), any person who, in connection with the
production or preparation of any program or program matter which is in-
tended for broadcasting over any radio station, accepts or agrees to accept,
or pays or agrees to pay, any money, service or other valuable considera-
tion for the inclusion of any matter as a part of such program or program
matter, shall, in advance of such broadcast, disclose the fact of such ac-
ceptance or payment or agreement to the payee's employer, or to the per-
son for whom such program or program matter is being produced, or to
the licensee of such station over which such program is broadcast.
(c) Subject to subsection (d), any person who supplies to any other
person any program or program matter which is intended for broadcast-
ing over any radio station shall, in advance of such broadcast, disclose to
such other person any information of which he has knowledge, or which
has been disclosed to him, as to any money, service or other valuable con-
sideration which any person has paid or accepted, or has agreed to pay
or accept, for the inclusion of any matter as a part of such program or
program matter.
(d) The provisions of this section requiring the disclosure of informa-
tion shall not apply in any case where, because of a waiver made by the
Commission under section 317(d), an announcement is not required to be
made under section 317.
(e) The inclusion in the program of the announcement required by
section 317 shall constitute the disclosure required by this section.
(f) The term "service or other valuable consideration" as used in this
section shall not include any service or property furnished without charge
or at a nominal charge for use on, or in connection with, a broadcast,
or for use on a program which is intended for broadcasting over any radio
station, unless it is so furnished in consideration for an identification in such
broadcast or in such program of any person, product, service, trademark,
or brand name beyond an identification which is reasonably related to the
use of such service or property in such broadcast or such program.
(g) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall, for
each such violation, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both.
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eluded in a broadcast program any material, whether vocal or visual, with-
out having announcement made on the program that the showing or hear-
ing of such material has been paid for. Criminal penalties shall be im-
posed upon any peison or company who violates this section as a-
mended. 31
The weakness of the existing legislation was its failure to curb the
activities of anyone but licensees.3 2 It ignored one of the plain
realities of broadcasting-that a licensee itself, whether a corpora-
tion, partnership or individual proprietor, does not normally make
specific decisions on programming, even though the licensee is le-
gally responsible for the decisions. Thus, persons who were not
subsumed under the heading "broadcast licensee" could themselves
engage in the kind of practices that were forbidden to broadcasters.
Realizing that, in practice, a broadcaster's chance to veto those
illegal third party practices was either nonexistent of impractical,
Congress chose to go directly to the source of the abuse. The re-
sponse was the requirement that all program material and an-
nouncements that are being paid for, either directly or indirectly,
carry with them an identification of just who is paying for them,
with certain exceptions.1 3
The new section 508 covers persons, other than licensees, who,
perhaps independently of the licensee and without the licensee's
knowledge, promoted either a product or a service, for considera-
tion, and failed to disclose the receipt of payment. Section 317(b),
in turn, compels the licensee to announce the fact that such a
third party arrangement has been made.
Congress' legislative activity came as a result of Congress' own
investigative activities and as a result of the FCC's consideration of the
31. COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATION OF REGULATORY COMMISSIONS AND AGEN-
CIES, H.R. Rep. No. 1258, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
32. The section as it has existed since the Federal Radio Act appears to go
only to payments to licensees as such. The fact that licensees now dele-
gate much of their actual programming responsibilities to others makes it
imperative that the coverage of section 317 be extended in some appropri-
ate manner to those in fact responsible for the selection or inclusion of
broadcast matter.
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. Rep. No. 1800, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1960).
33. The proviso is found in section 317(a)(1). In addition, the third party
problem as it involved the licensee required the licensee to exercise diligence in ob-
taining the information necessary to comply with the disclosure requirement. 47
U.S.C. § 317(c) (1970).
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sponsorship identification problem. The Special Subcommittee on
Legislative Oversight made its recommendations based on evidence
presented at its hearings on television quiz-shows and payola. 4 In
response, the FCC attempted to clarify and interpret the existing sec-
tion 317.11 The FCC's unexpected interpretation would have re-
quired a broadcaster to announce the identity of all donors of gifts
to the broadcaster if any of the items given were to be exposed in the
course of a broadcast. This interpretation would have required a
broadcaster to identify, for example, the donor of the gift of a phono-
graph record broadcast by the station. Since most broadcast stations
receive their phonograph records at a reduced or nominal cost, this
interpretation would have required an enormous number of sponsor-
ship identification announcements.
The industry urged that a reasonable middle ground be sought,
and the resulting legislative action, culminating in the amendments,
was aimed at
preventing recurrences of the extreme types of "payola" situations uncov-
ered by the Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight, and ...
avoiding some of the hardships which . . . resulted from the Commission's
interpretation of the . . . language of section 317 as set forth in the Com-
mission's Public Notice of March 16, 1960.30
Specifically, the so-called "reasonably related" proviso in section
317(a)(1) clarified the law in "gift" situations. The net effect of
the proviso, as illustrated extensively in the House Report would
be
to exempt from the announcement requirement some of the situations in-
volving the furnishing of services or property to licensees without charge
or at a nominal charge for use on or in the connection with broadcasts
.37
An exception to the proviso is noted in section 317(a)(2), in that
the amendments are not intended to effect a change in the Commis-
sion's treatment of political programs, or programs involving the dis-
34. COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATION OF REGULATORY COMMISSIONS AND AGEN-
ciEs, H.R. Rep. No. 1258, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
35. Sponsorship Identification of Broadcast Material, FCC 60-239, Public Notice
No. 85460 (March 16, 1960).
36. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. Rep. No. 1800,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1960).
37. Id. at 13.
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cussion of controversial .issues.38  Announcements in such situations
might be required regardless of whether or not paid matter is being
broadcast.
I. REGULATORY ASPECTS-EXISTING AND
PROPOSED REGULATIONS
Following the passage by Congress in 1960 of the amendments to
the Communications Act of 1934, resulting in the amended section
317 and the new section 508, the Commission promulgated new
sponsorship identification rules to implement these sections. The
regulations applicable to standard broadcast (AM) radio stations,"9
FM radio stations, 40 television stations,41 international radio sta-
tions42 and CATV systems43 are identical in substance, except that
there is an additional subparagraph in the television regulation pro-
viding that the announcements required by section 317(b) of the
Communications Act are waived with respect to "feature motion pic-
ture films produced initially and primarily for theater exhibition. '44
The text of what is now section 73.119, which applies to standard
broadcast stations, is set forth in the footnote below.45
38. See 47 U.S.C. § 3.15 (1970).
39. 47 C.F.R. § 73.119 (1972).
40. 47 C.F.R. § 73.289 (1972).
41. 47 C.F.R. § 73.654 (1972).
42. 47 C.F.R. § 73.789 (1972).
43. 47 C.F.R. § 76.221 (1972).
44. 47 C.F.R. § 73.654(e) (1972).
45. § 73.119. Sponsored programs, announcement of.-(a) When a stand-
ard broadcast station transmits any matter for which money, services, or
other valuable consideration is either directly or indirectly paid or prom-
ised to, or charged or received by, such station, the station shall broad-
cast an announcement that such matter is sponsored, paid for, or furnished,
either in whole or in part, and by whom or on whose behalf such consid-
eration was supplied: provided, however, that "service or other valuable
consideration" shall not include any service or property furnished without
charge or at a nominal charge for use on, or in connection with, a broad-
cast unless it is so furnished in consideration for an identification in a
broadcast of any person, product, service, trademark, or brand name be-
yond an identification which is reasonably related to the use of such serv-
ice or property on the broadcast.
(b) The licensee of each standard broadcast station shall exercise rea-
sonable diligence to obtain from its employees, and from other persons
with whom it deals directly in connection with any program matter for
broadcast, information. to enable such licensee to make the announcement
required by this section.
1974 PURITY VERSUS PLUGOLA
Included in the legislative history of the amended section 317
were twenty-seven examples selected by Congress to illustrate the
(c) In any case where a report (concerning the providing or accepting
of valuable consideration by any person for inclusion of any matter in a
program intended for broadcast) has been made to a standard broadcast
station as required by Section 508 of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended, of circumstances which would have required an announcement
under this section had the consideration been received by such standard
broadcast station, an appropriate announcement shall be made by such sta-
tion.
(d) In the case of any political program or any program involving the
discussion of public controversial issues for which any records, transcrip-
tions, talent, scripts, or other material or services of any kind are fur-
nished, either directly or indirectly, to a station as an inducement to the
broadcasting of such program, an announcement shall be made both at the
beginning and conclusion of such program on which such material or serv-
ices are used that such records, transcriptions, talent, scripts, or other ma-
terial or services have been furnished to such station in connection with
the broadcasting of such program: provided, however, that only one such
announcement need be made in the case of any such program of 5 minutes
duration or less, which announcement may be made either at the beginning
or conclusion of the program.
(e) The announcement required by this section shall fully and fairly
disclose the true identity of the person or persons by whom or in whose
behalf such payment is made or promised, or from whom or in whose be-
half such services or other valuable consideration is received, or by whom
the material or services referred to in paragraph (d) of this section are
furnished. Where an agent or other person contracts or otherwise makes
arrangements with a station on behalf of another, and such fact is known
to the station, the announcement shall disclose the identity of the person or
persons in whose behalf such agent is acting instead of the name of such
agent.
(f) In the case of any program, other than a program advertising com-
mercial products or services, which is sponsored, paid for, or furnished,
either in whole or in part, or for which material or services referred to
in paragraph (d) of this section are furnished, by a corporation, com-
mittee, association, or other unincorporated group, the announcement re-
quired by this section shall disclose the name of such corporation, com-
mittee, association, or other unincorporated group. In each such case the
station shall require that a list of the chief executive officers or members
of the executive committee or of the board of directors of the corporation,
committee, association or other unincorporated group shall be made avail-
able for public inspection at the studios or general offices of one of the
standard broadcast stations carrying the program in each community in
which the program is broadcast. Such lists shall be kept and made avail-
able for a period of 2 years.
(g) In the case of broadcast matter advertising commercial products
or services, an announcement stating the sponsor's corporate or trade
name, or the name of the sponsor's product, when it is clear that the men-
tion of the name of the product constitutes a sponsorship identification,
shall be deemed sufficient for the purposes of this section and only one
such announcement need be made at any time during the course of the
program.
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intended effect of the proviso clause in section 317(a)(1) regarding
"reasonably related" uses.4" This was considered necessary be-
cause of the Commission's previous efforts at revising its regulations,
which would have required a radio station, for example, to announce
after the playing of each phonograph record that the record was
a gift of XYZ Record Company, or was purchased at a reduced
price from XYZ Record Company. The examples selected by
Congress made it clear that such things as a refrigerator furnished
at no cost as a prop for a dramatic program would not have to be
treated as sponsorship for the purposes of section 317, unless there
were some use of the prop beyond that reasonably related to its
normal use. For example, a long-lasting camera shot on a refrigera-
tor, automobile or piano trademark would remove a use from the
reasonably related category. The "reasonably related" language is
also included in subparagraph (a) of each revised regulation with
nine more illustrative interpretations added by the Commission
when it issued the regulations as further elucidation of the phrase.4"
The new regulations and the thirty-six illustrative interpretations
were primarily intended to contend with the problem of "payola."
At about the same time, the Commission also undertook to deal
with the problem of "plugola" by adopting, on May 11, 1961, a
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, "In the Matter of Broadcast An-
nouncement of Financial Interests of Broadcast Stations and Net-
(h) The announcements required by Section 317 of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, as amended, are waived with respect to the broadcast
of "want ad" or classified advertisements sponsored by individuals. The
waiver granted in this paragraph shall not extend to classified advertise-
ments or want ads sponsored by any form of business enterprise, corporate
or otherwise. Whenever sponsorship announcements are omitted pursuant
to this paragraph the following conditions shall be observed:
(1) The licensee shall maintain a list showing the name, address and
(where available) the telephone number of each advertiser and shall attach
this list to the program log for each day's operations; and
(2) shall make this list available to members of the public who have
a legitimate interest in obtaining the information contained in the list.
(i) Commission interpretations in connection with the foregoing rules
may be found in the Commission's Public Notice entitled "Applicability
of Sponsorship Identification Rules" [53:1051, infra] and such supple-
ments thereto as are issued from time to time.
46. H.R. Rep. No. 1800. See note 35, supra; U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
3528-32 (1960).
47. In re Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F.C.C. 141, 151
(1963).
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works and Their Principals and Employees in Service and Commod-
ities Receiving Broadcast Promotions," Docket Number 14119.48
In a subsequent Tentative Report and Order in that docket, issued
in May, 1970, the Commission explained how it distinguishes plugola
from payola:
"Plugola" (is) the promotion or plugging on the air of goods or services
in which someone responsible for including the promotional material in
the broadcast, such as the licensee itself or a program performer, has a
financial interest.
"Plugola" is distinguishable from "payola" where persons responsible for
the selection or presentation of broadcast material present such material
(e.g., a particular musical record) in return for payment of consideration
by another party.4 9
The Commission explained that its new plugola rules were proposed
because it believed that the sponsorship identification rules are not
sufficient and because it believed that the public is entitled to know
the real interests of those trying to influence it.
With the May, 1970 issuance of the Tentative Report and Order,
the Commission stated that it had reviewed the record in the proceed-
ing and had tentatively reached certain conclusions (set forth in the
Tentative Report and Order) including the adoption of a rule con-
cerning plugola and twenty-three examples of its application to specific
situations. 50 The Commission further stated that, before taking final
action, it would permit interested parties to file additional comments.
As of April, 1974, the Commission had not taken final action.
48. 26 Fed. Reg. 4291 (1961).
49. Tentative Report and Order, P. & F. Rmo REG. CURRENT SERVICE 53:295,
296-97 & n. 2 (1970).
50. The Appendix of the Tentative Report and Order includes the following pro-
vision:
§ 73.1204 Avoidance of 'plugola' and announcement of outside financial
interests.
(a) Persons having direct or indirect financial interests in products,
services, commodities or performing talent which might be presented or
promoted over a station shall be insulated, to the extent possible, from the
process of selecting or presenting broadcast material which may involve
such products, services, commodities or talent.
(b) If, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) or where insula-
tion is impossible or inappropriate, presentation or promotion of a product,
service, commodity or talent (beyond what is customary with similar
things and would have occurred in the absence of the interest) occurs
wholly or partly because of the existence of a financial interest, disclosure
of the interest shall be made during the course of the program, unless it
is otherwise readily apparent from the content of the program.
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The following examples of Commission activity in the sponsorship
identification area illustrate the difficulties of compliance that have
arisen under the existing regulations:
a) Trade-Out Credits
A number of questions have arisen regarding "trade-out credits'""l
in audience-participation and quiz shows involving prizes. The
Commission stated on May 15, 1969 that it had learned that some
stations had not been computing as commercial time "certain kinds
of announcements broadcast in return for the receipt of 'money,
service or other valuable consideration,' as required by Section 317
... ,2 The Commission said that there were circumstances in
which networks, program producers or stations had received free
transportation, prize merchandise or other goods or services in re-
turn for identifications beyond those reasonably related to the use
of the service or property in the program. The Commission pointed
out that not only do sections 317 and 508 require identification of
this material as commercial, but also the regulations of the Commis-
sion require that it be logged as commercial time.
On July 16, 1969 the National Association of Broadcasters issued
a memorandum to its membership reminding broadcasters of the
(c) In addition to the above requirements, disclosure of a more than
nominal financial interest not readily apparent, held by the licensee or any
person actually or potentially in a position to include the material in the
program, shall be made where the interest is in a performer or performing
group, other than a team in a recognized sport, involved in a specific or
continuing appearance or performance mentioned on the air, or in the ap-
pearance or performance.
(d) The licensee of each station shall exercise reasonable diligence to
discover and become aware of the existence of financial interests which
may affect the selection or presentation of broadcast material, so as to
achieve compliance with paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of this section. As
indicated in the Examples hereinbelow, the reasonable diligence required
varies with the circumstances involved.
51. "Trade-out credits" are the listings at the end of a program, typically an
audience participation or quiz program in which numerous prizes are awarded, of
the suppliers of those prizes. The listing is required because the display of the
prizes on the program is normally a use of donated goods beyond a reasonably re-
lated use in the program and hence a commercial message. Since the display of
prizes may not be perceived as a commercial message by the ordinary viewer, a
sponsorship identification message in the form of a trade-out credit is broadcast at
the end of the program.
52. Logging and Computation as Commercial Matter, 34 Fed. Reg. 8060 (1969).
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Commision notice on May 15, 1969 and adding a few paragraphs
of explanation regarding the requirement of treating a trade-out as
a commercial message when it is used in return for identification
beyond that reasonably related to the use of the service or property.
To clarify this matter, the Association quoted two of the examples
used by Congress to illustrate its intent in passing section 317 .5
The problem was not easily solved, however. On March 13,
1970, the NAB sent a letter to eighty-two program syndicators in
an attempt to clarify and seek a common understanding concerning
the insertion of trade-out mentions in syndicated programs. The letter
referred to "credits or plugs for auto rentals, airlines, hotels and
other services which are frequently included in syndicated pro-
grams."54  The letter pointed out that section 508 has always re-
quired the identification of this trade-out commercial matter and
concluded by asking the syndicated program producers to cooperate
by giving each station advance notice of the amount of trade-out
commercial material in their programs.
The question of sponsorship identification of trade-out material
remained unresolved. On December 18, 1970, the FCC issued a
news release stating that the National Broadcasting Company and
the American Broadcasting Company had been notified that their
sponsorship identification announcements in certain audience-par-
ticipation and quiz shows did not meet the requirements of section
317 and the corresponding section of the Commission regulations. 55
The Commission said that in certain programs "in which program
producers or contractors received cash or other considerations to dis-
play or promote merchandise or services, the required sponsorship
announcements were given only visually and were hard to read be-
cause they were superimposed on the studio scend in small type
and move too fast to be read by an average viewer." '56  NBC had
used a three-second announcement at the end of each program
53. Letter from National Association of Broadcasters, Legal Department to its
Membership, July 16, 1969, copy on file in offices of the DePaul Law Review.
54. Letter from National Association of Broadcasters, Legal Department to Pro-
gram Syndicators, March 13, 1970, copy on file in offices of the DePaul Law Re-
view.
55. FCC, News Release, Rep. No. 9561 (December 18, 1970).
56. Id. See also American Broadcasting Co., 30 F.C.C.2d 827 (1971); In
re National Broadcasting Co., 27 F.C.C.2d 75 (1970).
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reading: "Prizes and/or promotional fees furnished -by . . . ," fol-
owed by the names of the suppliers. ABC had used a three to
five-second announcement at the end of each program reading:
"Prizes or products mentioned were furnished and/or paid for by
the manufacturer or supplier of the products or services identified
on this program." The Commission said that these announcements
seem to be "designed to obscure rather than to reveal the fact that
sponsorship payments have been made to program producers or the
network for advertising products or services. '5 7  The Commission
noted that the exact wording of sponsorship identification would be
left to the discretion of stations, but that the announcement should
at least state in understandable language that suppliers had paid
the network or producers to display or promote their products or
services. The Commission went on to suggest that "the video por-
tion of such announcement should be given in letters of sufficient
size to be readily legible to an average viewer; should be shown
against a background which does not reduce their legibility, and
should remain on the screen long enough to be read in full by an
average viewer.""8 Ihe Commission finally asked the networks to
submit a statement of their intentions in this matter.5 9
The networks responded by putting into effect new announce-
ments that satisfied the Commission's wishes in regard to the clear
identification of prize suppliers who furnished consideration in addi-
tion to prizes or who paid promotional fees. An additional ques-
tion remained: how to log the announcements at the end of the
program regarding the suppliers of the prizes? This question is unlike
those concerning the identification of commercial material and the
logging of commercial time for the mention of the prizes them-
selves. Rather, it is the question of the logging of time at the end
of the program explaining that the material within the program was,
for purposes of the Commission's rules, commercial time. The net-
works, not unnaturally, took the position that an announcement
simply pointing out that previous announcements were commercial
announcements need not itself be logged as a commercial announce-
ment. The networks pointed to the Commission's own rules regard-
57. In re National Broadcasting Co., 27 F.C.C.2d 75, 76 (1970).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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ing logging, which state, among other things, that "commercial mat-
ter" consists of "commercial continuity" and "commercial announce-
ments" and that this is either "the advertising message of a program
sponsor" or "any other advertising message for which a charge is
made or other consideration received." Since the networks were
not paid for the message at the end of a program identifying prize
furnishers, they did not wish to log the additional time as commer-
cial time.
The Commission did not accept this argument. On June 16,
1971, it sent a letter to the National Broadcasting Company inform-
ing it that:
The identification of the person paying for exposure of a product or ser-
vice in a quiz show or audience participation program is no less commer-
cial matter when contained in a "crawl" position at the end of a program
than when positioned in or in proximity to a commercial spot announce-
ment. The fact that the sponsor's identity is announced at the end of
the program, rather than at the time the product or service is advertised,
does not change the essential nature of the announcement.60
The Commission went on to note that the crawl might also be a
form of advertising implicit in the network's contract with the pro-
gram producer. The Commission also recognized that even the
mere mention of the name of a business entity has commercial ad-
vantage. The Commission ruled that the credit crawl must be
logged as commercial.
b) Performers' Kickbacks
Another sponsorship identification problem arises from "kick-
backs" of fees paid to performers. The chance to appear on a pop-
ular television program is so attractive to many performers that they
are willing to give up part or all of the fees that they would normally
receive for an appearance. Such fees are usually set by union con-
tracts and can involve substantial amounts of money.
On June 4, 1970, the FCC issued a public notice condemning
undisclosed kickbacks."' The Commission described three situa-
tions, of which the first is typical. Program producers had arranged
60. Letter from Federal Communications Commission to National Broadcasting
Co., June 16, 1971.
61. In re Application of Sections 317 and 508 of the Communications Act to
"Kickbacks" of Fees Paid to Performers, 23 F.C.C.2d 588 (1970).
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for performers to appear on a program for the normal union-scale
fee. As a condition of the appearances, however, part or all of
the fees were reimbursed to the producers by record companies
which employed the performers. In some of these cases, producers
did not disclose to stations that any financial consideration was re-
ceived for a performer's appearance. In many cases, however, a
statement at the end of the program was added to the effect that
"promotional assistance" or "promotion consideration" had been re-
ceived from the record company.
The Commission stated that all such situations involved violations
of sections 508 and 317 of the Communications Act because the
mere mention of the receipt of "promotional assistance" or "promo-
tional consideration" did not meet the requirements of its rules.
The Commission also said that certain other types of announcements
were insufficient, including "Miss X appeared through the courtesy
of Y Recording Co.," "Miss X's appearance was by arrangement
with . . . ," and "Miss X was brought to you through the coopera-
tion of Y." 2 It pointed out that in many cases producers or stations
had violated provisions of collective bargaining agreements with the
unions involved. The Commission concluded that, "At the very
least, an audio announcement must be made which states, in es-
sence, that the performer or an identified person acting on his be-
half has paid the program producer in order to appear on the pro-
gram ."
'8 s
c) The Program Title That Becomes a Product Name
The children's program "Mr. Wizard" has presented still another
sponsorship identification problem. The National Broadcasting
Company asked the Commission for a declaratory ruling regarding
the format of a proposed new "Mr. Wizard" program.6 4 One of
the commercials scheduled to be broadcast in the program involved
mention of a product name "Mr. Wizard." The product also used the
name and likeness of the principal performer on the program.
NBC offered to limit advertising of this kind of product to one of
the commercial openings in the program and also to limit such ad-
62. Id. at 589 n.1.
63. Id. at 589.
64. FCC, Broadcast Action, Rep. No. 10051 (August 5, 1971).
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vertising to thirty to sixty seconds per week of the total of six min-
utes of commercial time. NBC also stated that the product would
not be used or mentioned in any way in the program, that commer-
cial messages for the product would not refer to the program, that
there would be a break between the program and the commercial
messages with no lead-in relating the two, and that the sets used
for the program would be different from those sets used for the com-
mercials. In addition, NBC offered, if necessary, not to accept com-
mercials for the product in which the program performer appeared.
The Commission approved this proposal with additional conditions
-that not more than one minute of advertising for the product be
presented in each broadcast, rather than an average of up to one
minute per week; that the principal performer not participate in
commercials for the product; and that no advertising be presented
for any other product identified with the title of the program or its
principal performer.6"
d) The Public Serice Announcement with a
Cryptic Message
The meaning of the term "reasonable diligence," as it is used
in section 317(c)-and in subparagraph (b) of the sponsorship
identification regulations-has also received attention from the
Commission. The National Welfare Rights Organization com-
plained to the FCC that proper sponsorship identification had not
been made in a public service announcement about hyperactivity
in children broadcast by WSVA-TV in Harrisonburg, Virginia. Af-
ter Commission investigation, it appeared that the announcement
had been produced under a grant from Ciba Pharmaceutical Com-
pany and was distributed by the American Academy of Pediatrics.
The announcement itself included a statement that it had been pro-
duced as a public service by the Academy: Station WSVA-TV had
previewed the announcement to assure that it contained no com-
mercial content. WSVA-TV was not informed that Ciba had pro-
vided any funds for the announcement. From the Commission's in-
vestigation, it developed that Ciba is a producer of Ritalin, a drug
65. National Broadcasting Co., 22 R.R.2d 593, 594 (1971); FCC, Broadcast Ac-
tion, Rep. No. 11555 (June 1, 1973).
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frequently prescribed for treatment of hyperactivity in children. No
mention was made of this drug in the film.
The National Welfare Rights Organization not only asserted that
there was improper sponsorship identification, but that, since the
use of Ritalin for the treatment of hyperactivity presented a contro-
versial issue, WSVA-TV had violated section 317(a)(2) requiring
sponsorship identification of material furnished without charge that
discusses a controversial issue. The Organization also asserted
that WSVA-TV had not used reasonable diligence to obtain in-
formation from the American Academy of Pediatrics regarding the
Ciba role in production of the announcement. The Commission,
however, held that no identification of Ciba was required in the
announcement. The Commission further held that it could not find
that WSVA-TV had failed to exercise reasonable diligence. It said
that the station had acted properly by pre-screening the announce-
ment without noting anything which would raise questions about
proper sponsorship identification. Concluding, the Commission
noted that the announcement had been reviewed by a member of
the National Institute for Child Health and Human Development,
who found that it had "no medically controversial implications."66
e) The Sponsor with a Misleading Name
Questions of interpretation have also arisen regarding the pro-
visions of the FCC regulations concerning political programs and pro-
grams involving the discussion of controversial publiq issues.
During a 1963 gubernatorial primary in Kentucky involving former
Governors A.B. Chandler and Edward T. Breathitt, television sta-
tion WHAS televised a program entitled "The Chandler Years in
Review." The program was identified as a paid political broadcast
and its sponsor was identified as the "Committee for Good Govern-
ment." The program was critical of Chandler's administration and
his campaign manager protested the station's failure to identify the
"Breathitt for Governor Committee" as the sponsor of the program.
It developed that the Committee for Good Government had been
formed more than one year prior to the 1963 campaign for local
government inprovement in Pike County, Kentucky. The actual
66. 17 F.C.C.2d 416 (1969).
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funds for the program, however, were supplied by the "Committee
for Good Government Representing Ned Breathitt." The contracts
and other documents were signed by the Committee for Good Gov-
ernment.
The Commission assessed a forfeiture against WHAS for violation
of its regulation section 73.654. The station refused to pay the
forfeiture, and the FCC filed a complaint in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Kentucky to collect the for-
feiture.6 7 The District Court granted the station's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and the Commission appealed. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of
the District Court and concluded that WHAS had not violated any
provisions of the Communications Act and that the Commission's
regulations did not "by their terms require disclosure of the name
of the candidate (which the broadcast is intended or seeks to sup-
port) in addition to the name of the sponsor of the program."68
The court found it significant that the Commission chose to con-
centrate all its attention on section 73.654(f),69 while the court con-
sidered section 73.654(g) 70 more specifically applicable and said
that section 73.654(g) could be read as follows: "In case of any
program . . .which is sponsored . . .by a .. . committee . . .
the announcement required by this section shall disclose the name
of such ... committee."17' There was recognition by the court that
the Commission might not agree with its interpretation and said that
nothing in its opinion precluded the Commission "from adopting
a Regulation calculated to require a station to make reasonable ef-
forts to go beyond a named 'sponsor' for a political program in or-
der to ascertain the real party in interest for purposes of [sponsor-
ship identification] announcement[s] .'72
Four and a half years after the WHAS decision, the Commission
67. United States v. WHAS, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 603 (W.D. Ky. 1966).
68. United States v. WHAS, Inc., 385 F.2d 784, 786 (6th Cir. 1967), citing
the court below, 253 F. Supp. 603, 606 (W.D. Ky. 1966).
69. 47 C.F.R. § 73.654(f), which is identical to section 73.119(e), see note 45,
supra.
70. 47 C.F.R. § 73.654(g), which is identical to section 73.119(f), see note 45,
supra.
71. United States v. WHAS, Inc., 385 F.2d 784, 787 (6th Cir. 1967).
72. Id. at 788.
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undertook the drafting of a regulation such as that suggested by
the court in WHAS, and on May 17, 1972, issued a Notice of Pro-
posed Rule Making (Docket 19513) to amend and consolidate its
various sponsorship identification rules for AM, FM, television, in-
ternational broadcast stations and cable television systems. 78  The
Commission's Notice referred specifically to the decision in United
States v. WHAS and proposed a new single rule for radio, television
and cable to carry out the court's suggestion for clearer identification
of political sponsors. The proposed rule is set forth below.74  The
73. Docket No. 19513, 37 Fed. Reg. 10583 (1972).
74. § 73.1207 Sponsored programs.
(a) When a broadcast station transmits any matter for which money,
services, or other valuable consideration is either directly or indirectly paid
or promised to, or charged or received by, such station, the station shall
broadcast an announcement that such matter is sponsored, paid for, or fur-
nished, either in whole or in part, and by whom or on whose behalf such
consideration was supplied: provided, however, that "service or other val-
uable consideration" shall not include any service or property furnished
without charge or at a nominal charge for use on, or in connection with,
a broadcast unless it is so furnished in consideration for an identification
in a broadcast of any person, product, service, trademark, or brand name
beyond an identification which is reasonably related to the use of such
service or property on the broadcast.
(1) For the purposes of this section, the term "sponsored" shall be
deemed to have the same meaning as "paid for."
(b) The licensee of each broadcast station shall exercise reasonable
diligence to obtain from its employees, and from other persons with whom
it deals directly in connection with any program matter for broadcast, in-
formation to enable such licensee to make the announcement required by
this section.
(c) In any case where a report (concerning the providing or accepting
of valuable consideration by any person for inclusion of any matter in a
program intended for broadcasting) has been made to a broadcast station,
as required by Section 508 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, of circumstances which would have required an announcement
under this section had the consideration been received by such broadcast
station an appropriate announcement shall be made by such station.
(d) In the case of broadcast matter which is or relates to a political
broadcast or does or may involve the discussion of public controversial is-
sues for which any films, records, transcriptions, talent, scripts, or other
material or services of any kind are furnished, either directly or indirectly,
to a station as an inducement to the broadcasting of such matters, an an-
nouncement shall be made both at the beginning and conclusion of such
broadcast on which such material or services are used that such films, rec-
ords, transcriptions, talent, scripts, or other material or services have been
furnished to such station in connection with the broadcasting of such pro-
gram: provided, however, that only one such announcement need be made
in the case of any such program of 5 minutes' duration or less, either at
the beginning or conclusion of the broadcast.
(e) The announcement required by this section shall fully and fairly
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Commission has asked for comments on its proposal; as of April,
1974, no further action has been taken.
f) The Use of "Sponsored by. . . " in Political Broadcasts
In the period between the WHAS decision and the commence-
ment of Docket 19513, problems concerning sponsorship identifica-
disclose the true identity of the person or persons by whom or in whose
behalf such payment is made or promised, or from whom or in whose be-
half such services or other valuable consideration is received, or by whom
the material or services referred to in paragraph (d) of this section are
furnished. Where an agent or other person contracts or otherwise makes
arrangements with a station on behalf of another, and such fact is known
or should be known to the station, the announcement shall disclose the
identity of the person or persons in whose behalf such agent is acting in-
stead of the name of such agent. Where the material broadcast is or re-
lates to a political broadcast, or a matter which is or may be a controver-
sial issue of public importance and the person or persons paying for or
furnishing the program matter belong to a committee, association or other
unincorporated group, the station shall require that a list of the chief ex-
ecutive officers or members of the executive committee or of the board
of directors of the corporation, committee, association, or other unincor-
porated group shall be made available for public inspection at the studios
or general offices of the station. Such lists shall be kept and made avail-
able for a period of two years.
(f) In the case of broadcast matter advertising commercial products or
services, an announcement stating the sponsor's corporate or trade name,
or the name of the sponsor's product, when it is clear that the mention
of the name of the product constitutes a sponsorship identification, shall
be deemed sufficient for the purpose of this section and only one such
announcement need be made at any time during the course of the program.
(g) The announcements otherwise required by Section 317 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, are waived with respect to the
broadcast of "want ad" or classified advertisements sponsored by individ-
uals. The waiver granted in this paragraph shall not extend to classified
advertisements or want ads sponsored by any form of business enterprise,
corporate or otherwise. Whenever sponsorship announcements are omitted
pursuant to this paragraph the following conditions shall be observed:
(1) The licensee shall maintain a list showing the name, address, and
the telephone number where available of each advertiser and shall attach
this list to the program log for each day's operation; and
(2) Shall make this list available to members of the public who have
a legitimate interest in obtaining the information contained in the list.
(h) Commission interpretations in connection with the provisions of
this section have been summarized in the Commission's Public Notice en-
titled 'Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules,' May 6, 1963,
(FCC 63-409, 28 Fed. Reg. 4732, 40 FCC 141) and printed in full in
different volumes of the Federal Communications Reports.
(i) The announcements required by Section 317(b) of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934, as amended, are waived with respect to feature motion
picture films produced initially and primarily for theatre exhibition.
NOTE: The waiver heretofore granted by the Commission in its Report
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
tion of political broadcasts have continued to plague both broadcast-
ers and the Commission. On October 2, 1970, the Commission issued
a Public Notice regarding political broadcasts."v  The Commis-
sion stated that it had learned that such identifications as "State Cit-
izens For (Candidate's Name), John Smith, Chairman" and "Au-
thority of (Candidate's Name) Committee, John Smith, Treasurer"
were being used as the sole sponsorship identification of political
announcements and programs. In its Public Notice, the Commis-
sion quoted section 317(a)(1) of the Communications Act and ad-
vised broadcasters that this requires that political broadcasts must
be "so announced in the statutory language." Further, mere men-
tion of the name of the sponsor does not constitute compliance.
This illuminating Notice was followed by a Notice on October
6, 1970, entitled "Sponsorship Identification of Political Broadcasts
Clarified. '70  In it, the Commission stated that it had received a
number of inquiries concerning its Notice of October 2 asking
whether the use of the phrase "sponsored by" would comply with
the statutory obligation. The Commission responded by quoting the
applicable sections of the Commission's regulations, section
73.119(a) 77 and the corresponding paragraphs of the other regula-
tions for FM and television. The FCC concluded that announce-
ments or programs "which state that they were 'sponsored by
V ..,, would comply with the statute and rules.
The area still appears to be one that requires clarifiction. On
June 1, 1973, the Commission issued a Public Notice to all broad-
cast licensees calling attention once more to the sponsorship identifi-
cation regulations and in particular the sections applicable to politi-
cal and controversial material.7 The Commission said it had
and Order of November 21, 1960 (FCC 60-1369; 25 FR 11224,
Nov. 26, 1960), continues to apply to programs filmed or re-
corded on or before June 20, 1963 when § 73.654, the predeces-
sor television rule, went into effect.
75. FCC, Public Notice, Sponsorship Identification-Political Broadcasts, Octo-
ber 2, 1970.
76. FCC, Public Notice, Sponsorship Identification of Political Broadcasts Clari-
fied, October 6, 1970.
77. See note 45, supra.
78. See note 75, supra.
79. In re Identification of Source of, or Party Supplying, Certain Broadcast Mat-
ter, 41 F.C.C.2d 333 (1973).
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learned that some broadcast licensees were taking prerecorded ma-
terial furnished by long distance telephone or through tape or film
and presenting it in some cases as the work of their own correspond-
ents. The material in fact, however, was furnished by private
businesses, trade associations, government departments, agencies
and legislators.80 The Commission pointed out that false attribution
of such material to a station's own news correspondent would raise
serious questions regarding the qualifications of a licensee to oper-
ate in the public interest. It also pointed out that the existing rules
concerning sponsorship identification would, in any event, require
that an announcement be made as to the source of any such pro-
gramming.
III. REGULATORY ASPECTS-ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED
REGULATIONS
The preceding examples of administrative action by the FCC, and
one court decision, are not an exhaustive portrayal of the complex-
ities of sponsorship identification. Rather, they illustrate the types
of problems that broadcasters have faced and the response of the
Commission, both in enforcement of its existing regulations and in
proposals of new regulations.
In its "plugola" proceeding, Docket 14119, the Commission set
forth two goals: (a) that broadcast material be presented on the
basis of its own merits and not because of outside financial interests,
and (b) that, to the extent outside financial interests are an influ-
ence on the presentation of broadcast material, these interests be
disclosed to the audience. These two goals are the heart of the
sponsorship identification question, and the Commission has ex-
pressed them, as it often does in making new regulatory proposals,
in terms of the public interest standard. The goals are presented
as unarguable; it would be unthinkable to attack them, for to do
so would be to take a position against purity of motives and against
honesty in broadcasting. However, thirteen years of experience fol-
lowing the amendment of section 317 and the addition of section
508, and the present tentative status of the Commission's regulations
80. Such material is entirely different from the news wire service materials, such
as that furnished by the Associated Press and United Press International, for which
broadcasters pay substantial amounts.
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concerning sponsorship identification demonstrate that the Commis-
sion has not found a way to tell its licensees clearly and simply
what their obligations are.
An examination of the regulations proposed in Docket 14119
("plugola") and Docket 19513 ("payola"-the reorganization and
consolidation of the existing sponsorship identification rules) 8
shows clearly the difficulties the Commission has created for itself . 2
Docket 19513, which proposes a new regulation, Section 1207, to
replace the existing separate regulations for AM, FM and television,
is, in some ways, a step in the right direction. The Commission
adopted the suggestion made in 1967 by the court of appeals in
the WHAS case by tightening up the requirement for the identifica-
tion of principals. Unfortunately, the Commission overreacted by
compelling stations who deal with agents to disclose the identity of
the principal not only when the station knows but also when the
station should know that the agent is acting for a principal. It re-
mains to be seen whether this imposes a different standard of con-
duct on stations than the "reasonable diligence" established by both
the existing and proposed regulations as a standard for obtaining
information for other aspects of sponsorship identification announce-
ments. Instead of letting stations wonder about the difference, it
would seem appropriate for the Commission to redraft the proposed
81. See proposed section 73.1207, note 74, supra.
82. It should be noted that the "plugola" proceeding is not concerned solely
with the identification of sponsored materials. A significant part of the proposed
rule, subsection (a) requires that persons having financial interests in anything that
might be promoted over a station be insulated from the process of selection of ma-
terial for broadcast. This section makes explicit a requirement that has existed for
some time as a matter of Commission policy. In In re Crowell-Collier Broadcasting
Corp., 14 F.C.C.2d 358, 8 R.R.2d 1080 (1966), the Commission said:
The Commission has held before, and it is reiterated here, that a licensee
has an obligation to exercise special diligence to prevent improper use of
its radio facilities when it has employees in a position to influence program
content who are also engaged in outside activities which may create a con-
flict between their private interests and their roles as employees of the sta-
tion.
The Commission also recently admonished a radio station for permitting its disc
jockeys to promote their own personal appearances (non-broadcast) in "a manner
which is apparently not in compliance with the Commission's policies and the public
interest." The Commission noted that the station had transgressed in two ways.
First, the disc jockeys were not controlled in their references to their personal inter-
ests, i.e., they were not insulated from the broadcast material selection process. Sec-
ond, the material broadcast was not logged as commercial time. WBAP, FCC Rep.
No. 12081, January 23, 1974.
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regulation. In the WHAS-TV case, referred to above, 3 a similar
issue arose when the Commission considered whether or not
WSVA-TV exercised reasonable diligence in determining who was
the sponsor of a public service announcement. The interpretation
the Commission placed on the "reasonable diligence" standard in
that case was a sensible balancing of the needs of broadcasters and
the public. Broadcasters can only hope that it will not be replaced
by a standard of "thou shalt know what thou should know."
There are more fundamental difficulties with Dockets 19513 and
14119. There is no reference in either proceeding to the other,
nor is there any apparent attempt to harmonize their provisions
towards the achievement of the Commission's goals. The demarca-
tion line between payola and plugola is a hazy one at best. The
issues are frequently confused, and there is one central aspect to
both-the fact that personnel in a position to choose program matter
are always, to some extent, exposed to some outside financial in-
fluences, simply because they are humans working for a living.
The new section 1207, proposed by Docket 19513, requires spon-
sorship identification of material transmitted by a station for which
"money, services or other valuable consideration is either directly
or indirectly paid or promised to, or charged or received by" a sta-
tion. This requirement, plus the requirements of section 508 of
the Communications Act,84 plus the reasonable diligence required
of a station to obtain information for the required announcements,
add up to a more than adequate means of dealing with plugola,
as well as payola.
The Commission, however, sees plugola as a problem requiring
separate treatment. In its Docket 14119, proposing a new section
1204, the Commission, after stating its general principles concerning
insulation from outside financial interests and disclosure of such in-
terests, explains its new rule as follows:
69. In line with these principles, the general requirements of the rule
adopted are as follows: persons with outside financial interests, such as
disk-jockeys, must be insulated to the extent possible from the selection
or presentation of material which might include that in which they have
an interest. Even where insulation in the legal sense is not possible-
83. United States v. WHAS, Inc., 385 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1967). See textual
discussion at note 66, supra.
84. 47 U.S.C. § 508 (1970).
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for instance, where the interest is that of the licensee itself or a related
company, which cannot be "insulated" from what is presented over its sta-
tion-adequate steps must be taken to insure that the outside interest is
not a motivating factor in the selection of presentation of material broad-
cast. For instance, records issued by an affiliated company should not be
presented when they would not have otherwise been played on the basis
of merit, appeal or popularity.
70. If these principles are strictly applied and enforced, no "plugola"
disclosure announcement is necessary. If they cannot be or are not, or
if there is any question as to whether they have been completely effective,
an announcement disclosing the interest is required when products, ser-
vices, commodities or performing talent in which the interest is held are
presented or promoted on the air, beyond that which is customary and
would have taken place in the absence of the interest, where the interest
is (or may have been wholly or partly) the motivation for the presentation
or promotion.
71. Irrespective of what is regarded as motivation, an announcement
of the interest is required when it is a more than nominal interest in a
performer or performers or a performance (other than a team in a recog-
nized sport), there is mention of a specific or continuing performance in-
volving the subject of the interest, and the interest is held by a person
actually or potentially in a position to include the mention in the program.
72. No announcement of the interest is required if readily apparent
from the content of the program. When required, the announcement shall
disclose in general terms all known interests, the holder's relation to the
station, and what the interest is in. The announcement, if required, may
be made at any time during the program and may be in any form, for
example question and answer during an interview program, which discloses
to the audience that a present financial interest exists.
73. The licensee shall use due diligence to ascertain the outside finan-
cial interests of its employers (as well as itself and related companies),
and other program participants, so as to comply with the other provisions
of the rule. This varies with the circumstances and type of program, as
discussed above and in the examples adopted.8 5
In fairness to the Commission, it must be pointed out that it rec-
ognizes that its proposals in Docket 14119 are far reaching and com-
plex. In the closing paragraphs of its Tenative Report and Order,
the Commission says:
76. Effective date and compliance. We are aware that the subject in-
volved here is a complex one, involving a very wide range of situations
and concepts, in which over-all regulation is being undertaken for the first
time and there are only a limited number of precedents even in individual
situations. Therefore, we believe that a degree of latitude in enforcement
of the rule is in order and are acting as follows:
85. Tentative Report and Order, P & F RADIo REG. CURRENT SERVICE % 53:295,
322-23 (1970).
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77. First, the rule will become effective only on [date to be inserted].
This will give licensees time to review their station operations and deter-
mine what changes and steps, if any, are required to insure compliance.
78. Second, in the initial period after the effective date, action looking
toward enforcement will be taken only in obvious violation situations.
Only in the more flagrant of these will initial action looking toward sanc-
tions be taken; in other cases a letter of warning will issue. 86
Notwithstanding this recognition of the difficulties it is creating for
itself, the Commission has not come to grips with far more serious
problems which have been pointed out by the industry.
In a somewhat unusual display of industry unanimity, the three
major networks and the National Association of Broadcasters filed
joint Comments in response to the Commission's 1970 Notice in
Docket 14119. These Comments include a list of six considerations
which the commenting parties urged the Commission to weigh care-
fully:
I. The Commission should continue to apply the "reasonably related"
test established by statute;
II. The proposed rules will be difficult to interpret and will needlessly
add clutter to broadcasts;
III. A policy statement would be better suited than rules in order to ac-
complish the Commission's purpose;
IV. News and public affairs programs should be exempted from the pro-
posed requirements.
V. The licensee should have the obligation only to exercise reasonable
diligence to discover the existence of financial interests likely to be
"plugged" on the air.
VI. Feature films, commercials, and previously recorded programs should
be exempt.8 7
These six considerations are a succinct expression of legitimate con-
cerns which are aroused by the Commission's proposed rules. Even
though the Commission conceives the problem to be one of "purity"
or "honesty" in broadcasting, these considerations deserve to be
weighed carefully and discussed by the Commission in a manner
different from the lofty moral tone that it has adopted so far.
For example, the NAB and the three networks have asked for
the exemption of news and public affairs programs from the pro-
posed requirements regarding identification of plugola. If one's
86. Id. at 324.
87. Comments of NAB, ABC, CBS and NBC, Docket No. 14119 at 3, October
15, 1970.
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outlook is sanctimonious, it is difficult to conceive of a more out-
rageous proposal than one which suggests that plugola be allowed
(or, at any rate, not identified) in news and public affairs programs.
In fact, however, the proposal is an eminently sensible one, and
it is probably necessary if the Commission is to avoid a serious test
of the new regulation's impingement on first amendment rights of
broadcasters and their audiences.
The prospect of broadcast news reporters inquiring of all inter-
viewees whether the motives for their statements are in any way
commercial is not too far-fetched when the wording of section 1204
is examined. In fact, the Commission clearly expects licensees to
be concerned about plugola in news programs. The discussion in
Example Number 20, from the list of illustrative examples that ac-
company section 1204, includes the following: "If 'plugola' appears
to occur in spot news programs, inquiry should be made and an
announcement made, if needed, on subsequent programs including
the same material."88
If broadcasters are to function as a news medium in any sense
that is comprehended under ordinary first amendment considera-
tions, the dangers of section 1204 are apparent. It is nearly incon-
ceivable that print media reporters and editors could ever be sub-
jected to the kind of detailed and complex administrative guidance
that section 1204 would impose on broadcasters. Printed publica-
tions using second class postal privileges are subject to a require-
ment that material that is paid for be identified as an advertisement,
but the simple requirements of Title 18, United States Code, sec-
tion 1734 are hardly comparable to the labyrinth of section 1204
and its twenty-three examples. Newspapers and magazines may
from time to time print material that advances undisclosed economic
interests; fortunately they have no Federal Newspaper Commis-
sion to guard their purity and protect their readers. This kind of
loosely administered freedom to print seems more compatible with
the goals of the first amendment than the section 1204 approach,
even though the writings might be considered "commercial" by
some of the tests referred to in Section I of this article.
The Commission should be aware of what life would be like in
a world in which plugola is totally exposed. As -the NAB and the
88. Notice of Tentative Report and Order, 35 Fed. Reg. 7982, 7984 (1970).
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networks have pointed out in their comments, "clutter," the miscel-
laneous non-program material that is so annoying to audiences,
could eventually overpower the programs in order to accommodate
the necessary disclosures. The work that would go into the prep-
aration of the disclosures is staggering to contemplate. Speculation
about motives, as subjective an issue as can be imagined, would
consume enormous amounts of time and energy by broadcasters,
but there would be no alternative, because the Commission has
framed its proposed rule as a requirement of simple honesty. How
could a broadcaster, licensed to serve the public interest, spend any-
thing less than his full energies in assuring the purity of -the motives
of all his employees?
CONCLUSION
This article has studied an effort by an administrative agency to
achieve regulatory goals which are, in essence, as controversial as
mom's apple pie. Everyone would like to see broadcast programs
presented on their merits alone; if they are not presented on their
merits, most people would like to know what hidden influences are
at work. Moving from these lofty goals to the workaday problems
of writing regulations has proven to be a chore too great for the
Federal Communications Commission.
What has occurred should not come as a surprise to students of
administrative law, since there exists a closely comparable and
equally untractable problem at the same agency. The Fairness
Doctrine provides a splendid example of the mischief the Commis-
sion can create when it confuses high moral purpose with reasonable
regulatory goals.8 9 Even after winning a stunning victory when the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of its doctrine, 90 the
Commission is still fighting the same old battles over the practical
aspects of its enforcement. One outcome of its administrative over-
kill is that there is now an indication of weakening judicial support
for the doctrine.91 Needless to say, the Commission has issued a
Notice of Proposed Rule Making on the subject.
89. Blake, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC: Fairness and the Emperor's New
Clothes, 23 FED. CoM. B.J. 75 (1969).
90. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
91. See, e.g., Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 71-79
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There will undoubtedly be occasional spectacular news reports
from time to time about plugola and payola in broadcast entertain-
ment programs, but the Commission has not shown that its proposed
scheme of regulation, unprecedented in its complexity, will either
reduce such incidents, or serve to further first amendment goals
in one of the most important media of communications. The lack
of any demonstrated need for the proposed regulations is under-
scored by the fact that what abuses there are appear to be violations
of existing statutes and Commission regulations.
It is axiomatic that regulations issued by an administrative agency
to a regulated industry should provide guidance that is as simple,
practical and straight-forward as possible. In addition, the regula-
tions that are issued by the Federal Communications Commission
must meet a higher test, that of avoiding interference with freedom
of speech, as prescribed both by the first amendment and section
326 of the Communications Act.92 As Mr. Justice Brennan observed
in NAACP v. Button, "Precision of regulation must be the touch-
stone . . ." in questions involving the adequacy of protection of
first amendment rights. 3 The regulations issued by the Federal
Communications Commission and currently in force relative to
sponsorship identification scarcely meet the test of simplicity and
practicality, but at least the regulations now in force have a thirteen-
year history of interpretation so that broadcasters, as a practical mat-
ter, can live with them. The regulations proposed in Dockets
14119 and 19513 would drastically change broadcast programming
and the responsibilities of those who create the programming. The
proposed regulations are, for the most part, complex, impractical
and ambiguous. It is all too clear, moreover, that they will impede
the processes of development, selection and production of program-
ming, without corresponding benefits to the public, which increas-
ingly relies on them for news, information and ideas. Both the
broadcast industry and the public deserve better from the Commis-
sion.
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon. J., dissenting); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 148-70 (1973) (Douglas, J., con-
curring).
92. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970).
93. 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1962).
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